III. The Essential Intent of the "Middle Way" Is to Split China
Following more than half-a-century's concerted efforts of the peoples of all its ethnic groups, Tibet has embarked on a path of development conforming to the times and the people's fundamental interests, and made tremendous strides forward. However, in their pursuit of "Tibetan independence," the 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters have always turned a blind eye to Tibet's development and progress, denying the achievements made by the people of Tibet and rejecting the sound path that Tibet has taken.
Over the course of the years, the Dalai group has kept modifying its tactics for "Tibetan independence." In March 1959, it fled to India after they failed in an all-out armed revolt that they launched; subsequently it began to publicly advocate "Tibetan independence" and tried to achieve it by force. In the late 1970s, when relations between China and the US improved, the Dalai group, finding that the international situation was unfavorable to it, started to alter its tactics, shifting its attempts from achieving open independence to achieving disguised independence by cloaking them with what is called the "middle way." After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, it again misread the situation and believed that the time was right, it began to demand "complete independence" once again. After 1994, having realized that there was no possibility of achieving this goal, it turned again to the "middle way" and began to lobby for what it now termed "a high degree of autonomy." In recent years, it has intensified its efforts to promote this "middle way" and to disguise it.
The "middle way," also known as the "way of meditation on the mean," is a Buddhist term. It is the Dalai group which has politicized it. Its claims can be summarized into five major points.
First, it denies the fact that Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times; instead it claims that Tibet was "an independent state" which was "occupied by China in 1951," and that "Tibetans have the right to independence from a historic perspective." Second, it seeks to establish a "Greater Tibet" that has never existed at any time in history, claiming that the "Tibet issue" concerns 6 million Tibetans and that Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai and other areas that Tibetans and people of other ethnic minorities inhabit in compact communities should be incorporated into a unified administrative region. Third, it demands "a high degree of autonomy" that is not subject to any constraint whatsoever from the central government, denies the leadership of the central government and Tibet's present social and political systems, and proposes to establish an "autonomous government" under which "Tibetans" (in truth the Dalai party) take full charge of all affairs other than diplomacy and national defense. Fourth, it opposes the central government to garrison troops in Tibet and, despite its superficial agreement that the central government holds the authority over national defense, it demands that the central government "withdraws all Chinese troops" to turn Tibet into an "international zone of peace." And fifth, in total disregard of the fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has been a multi-ethnic region since ancient times, it denies the access of other ethnic groups to "Greater Tibet" and drives them out of regions where they have lived for generations.
Under the "middle way," the Dalai group feigns acceptance of China's sovereignty in Tibet to seize the reins of power and set up a semi-independent political regime under the control of the "Tibetan independence" forces, and ultimately seek full sovereignty and achieve "Tibetan independence" when its governing power is consolidated.
As a political strategy for achieving independence through a series of steps, the "middle way" does not tally with China's history, national reality, state Constitution, laws and basic systems. Neither does it conform to Tibet's history, reality and ethnic relations. Moreover, it runs counter to the fundamental interests of all the people of China, including the Tibetans.
- Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times, and has never been an independent nation.
Tibet has been an integral part of China since ancient times, and, as one of the centuries-old ethnic groups in China, the Tibetans have made important contributions to the formation and evolution of the Chinese nation - a single family sharing a common destiny. Archaeological and historical research shows that since ancient times the Tibetan people have been closely connected with the Han and other ethnic groups in such aspects as consanguinity, language, culture and others, and that there has never been a break in economic, political and cultural exchanges between Tibet and the rest of China. The Tubo regime established in Tibet in the seventh century was a local government of ancient China, which made an important contribution to developing China's southwest frontier.
It was during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) that China's central government formally incorporated Tibet into the central administration. The Yuan government set up the Supreme Control Commission of Buddhism and Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs to directly administer local military, political and religious affairs, conduct censuses in Tibet, set up courier stations, collect taxes, station troops and appoint officials; it also issued and enacted the Yuan criminal law and calendar in Tibet to fully exercise effective administration. The Ming government (1368-1644) implemented a policy of multiple enfeoffment, conferring "prince of Dharma," "national master in Tantrism" and other honorific titles upon religious leaders in various parts of Tibet. Succession to such titles required the approval of the emperor, who would send an envoy to confer the official title on each new prince.
During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the central government granted honorific titles to the leaders of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism - the 5th Dalai Lama and the 5th Panchen Lama - officially establishing the titles of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni and their political and religious status in Tibet. From then on, it became an established convention that the central government conferred the titles of Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni.
From 1727, the Qing government started to station grand ministers resident in Tibet to supervise and manage local administration on behalf of the central authorities; in total it appointed more than 100 such grand ministers resident in Tibet. In 1751, the Qing government abolished the system under which the secular princes held power, and formally appointed the 7th Dalai Lama to administer the local government of Tibet, thus establishing theocracy there, and it set up the Kashag (cabinet) composed of four Kalons (ministers) that took orders from the grand ministers resident in Tibet and the Dalai Lama. In 1774, when the British East India Company sent a representative to Tashilhunpo in an attempt to build a direct relationship with Tibet, the 6th Panchen replied that Tibet was part of China's territory and all its affairs were handled in accordance with imperial edicts from the Chinese emperor. In 1793, the Qing government promulgated the Imperially Approved Ordinance for Better Governance of Tibet (29-Article), improving several systems by which the central government administered Tibet. The Ordinance clearly stipulated that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other Living Buddhas had to follow the procedure of "drawing lots from the golden urn," and the selected candidate would be subject to approval by the central authorities of China. Observing the Ordinance, the 10th, 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas and the 8th, 9th and 11th Panchen Lamas were selected in this way, but 13th and 14th Dalai Lamas and the 10th Panchen Lama did not go through the procedure of "drawing lots from the golden urn" with approval from the central authorities.
The Republic of China (1912-1949) continued the central government's sovereignty over Tibet and maintained its sovereignty and jurisdiction there. The last Qing emperor Puyi declared in 1912 in the Edict on Qing Emperor's Abdication, "I will return sovereignty to the whole nation and establish it as a constitutional republic," and "Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan ethnic groups will enjoy territorial integrity in this great Republic." The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China in 1912 and the General Outline of the Constitution for the Political Tutelage Period of the Republic of China in 1931 both stipulated that Tibet was a part of the territory of the Republic of China. In 1929, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China in Nanjing established a Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs to exercise administrative jurisdiction over Tibet. In 1940, the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs opened an office in Lhasa as a permanent establishment of the central government in Tibet. The identification and enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama and the 10th Panchen Lama were both done with approval from the government of the Republic of China. In the years of the Republic of China, the central government did its utmost to safeguard the nation's sovereignty over Tibet though hamstrung by constant civil conflicts among warlords and the intrinsic weakness of the nation.
After the People's Republic of China was founded, it became its historic duty to bring an end to national separation and realize national unification under new historical conditions. The peaceful liberation of Tibet and the stationing of the People's Liberation Army in Tibet were two right steps taken by the central government of China in exercising national sovereignty and safeguarding national unification and territorial integrity after a wholesale regime change. The 17-Article Agreement signed in 1951 between the central government and the local government of Tibet was a domestic agreement reached on the basis of respecting and accepting the historical fact that Tibet is part of China. After its peaceful liberation, Tibet had gradually embarked on the socialist path, and the people of Tibet have worked with people of other ethnic groups around the country towards China's progress and development.
History demonstrates clearly that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times, and it has never been an independent nation. In today's world, all countries acknowledge this as a fact; no country has ever acknowledged "Tibetan independence." There is no question about Tibet's political status. After 1959, when he opposed the reform measure abolishing serfdom and defected abroad, the 14th Dalai Lama has no authority whatsoever to represent the people of Tibet, nor has he the right to decide the future and destiny of Tibet. The self-styled "government-in-exile" is an illegitimate political organization engaged in secessionist activities, and no country around the world acknowledges it.
- "Greater Tibet" is sheer fantasy, and does not conform to China's history and national conditions. Talking about the "middle-way" approach by the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers is invariably accompanied by references to "Greater Tibet." In their hypothesis, this "Greater Tibet" extends to southern Xinjiang and the Hexi Corridor in the north, central Gansu and central Sichuan in the east, and to central Yunnan in the south, covering all of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province, half of Sichuan Province, half of Gansu Province, a quarter of Yunnan Province, and the southern part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In total, this represents an area larger than one quarter of China's total territory.
In China's entire history, there has never been any geographical entity that supports this concept of a "Greater Tibet." The administrative repartition of contemporary China came into being over a long historical course. During the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Tubo Kingdom was a multi-ethnic regime established by the Tubo people together with other ethnic groups and tribes inhabiting the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and surrounding areas. After the Tubo Kingdom collapsed, the Tubo people shared the plateau together with other ethnic groups without any unified regime. During the Yuan Dynasty, the central government set up the U-Tsang High Pacification Commissioner's Office in Tibet to exercise jurisdiction over Tibet, and Do-kham and Domed High Pacification Commissioner's Offices in other Tibetan-inhabited areas. The three High Pacification Commissioner's Offices were under the Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs (previously the Supreme Control Commission for Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs) of the central government. The central government of the Ming Dynasty set up the u-Tsang Military Command and the Ngari Civilian and Military Command in Tibet, which were later upgraded to the u-Tsang Regional Military Commission. It also set up the Do-kham Military Command in the Do-kham area, which was later upgraded to the Do-kham Regional Military Commission. In 1726, in view of the upheaval in Tibet, the Qing imperial government adjusted the administrative divisions of Tibet and neighboring Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai, bringing into being the basic structure of administrative divisions under which the Qing central authorities governed Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas. This structure has remained to this day. Never at any point prior to the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951 did the scope of administrative jurisdiction of the local government of Tibet extend beyond the present Tibet Autonomous Region.
"Greater Tibet" was a product of Western colonialist invasions of China and a product of their efforts to split China. The concept is not the brainchild of the Dalai group; it was proposed by British colonialists at the Simla Conference which took place from 1913 to 1914, and it was then written into the illegitimate Simla Accord. The Accord divided Tibetan-inhabited areas in China into "Outer Tibet" and "Inner Tibet"; the former covered the present Tibet Autonomous Region and would have "autonomy," while the latter included Tibetan-inhabited areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, to which the Chinese government could dispatch officials and troops. The proposal was rejected outright by the whole of China, and the delegates of the Chinese government refused to sign and recognize the Simla Accord. As a result the Simla Conference broke down, and the Simla Accord never had any status as a legal document.
However, British colonialists continued to foster and support secessionist forces from the upper levels of Tibetan society, who persisted with their plans to achieve "autonomy" with British support. In his later years the 13th Dalai Lama, who had been exploited by British colonialists, finally woke up to what was happening. In 1930, he told Liu Manqing, a representative of the central government, in Lhasa: "Since it is all Chinese territory, why draw lines between yourselves and ourselves? If we allow ourselves to become ensnared in conflict... it is like brothers fighting each other; it makes no sense."
"Greater Tibet" ignores the history and culture created by all the ethnic groups who have lived together on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. After many years of contact and exchange, some of China's ethnic groups have spread over vast areas, while others live in individual concentrated communities in small areas. In China, it is quite common that people of one single ethnic group live in different administrative regions, while in a single administrative region there can be many different ethnic groups. On the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, particularly in its neighboring regions, there have lived more than a dozen ethnic groups since ancient times. These include Han, Tibetan, Hui, Monba, Lhoba, Qiang, Mongol, Tu, Dongxiang, Bao'an, Yugur, Salar, Lisu, Naxi, Pumi, and Nu, all of whom are masters of this land. The present Tibet and the four provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai are all multi-ethnic regions, which is the result of a long-term history of exchange, communication and blending among various ethnic groups of China. For reasons of geography, history and customs, different Tibetan tribes are under the jurisdiction of the four different provinces, and have lived together with other ethnic groups in these places over a very long time. In the course of this long history, the Tibetan people, spread across different administrative regions, have both maintained some common features and displayed certain differences in language, customs and other aspects. At the same time, they have engaged in frequent political, economic and cultural exchanges with people of other local ethnic groups, and maintained close ties with them, particularly in the economic field, thus sharing the same or similar regional and cultural characteristics with other local peoples.
"Greater Tibet" disrespects China's national conditions. The system of regional ethnic autonomy is one of the basic elements of China's political system. Regional ethnic autonomy means that the minority ethnic groups, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they live in compact communities and establish their own organs of self-government to exercise their right of autonomy. Ethnic autonomous areas are classified into the three levels of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All ethnic autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China. After New China was founded in 1949, in addition to Tibet Autonomous Region, eight Tibetan autonomous prefectures, one Tibetan and Qiang autonomous prefecture, one Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture and two Tibetan autonomous counties were set up in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, while in some Tibetan autonomous prefectures there are autonomous counties of other ethnic minorities.
Such administrative division takes into account the distribution of different ethnic groups with a view to their future development. It gives expression to the combination of both the ethnical and regional, both political and economic factors that are the outcome of history and contemporary reality, and is conducive to the common prosperity and development of the various ethnic groups in the great family of the Chinese nation. Practice has proven that this system is successful. As the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 14: "Once established, no ethnic autonomous area may, without legal procedures, be abolished or merged. Once defined, no boundaries of an ethnic autonomous area may, without legal procedures, be altered. Where abolition or merger or alteration is necessary, it will be proposed by the relevant department of the State organ at the next higher level with the organ of self-government of the ethnic autonomous area concerned after full consultation before it is submitted for approval according to legal procedures."
In summary, the concept of "Greater Tibet" the Dalai group seeks to establish runs counter to both history and contemporary reality, and is totally divorced from China's national conditions. "Greater Tibet" disregards the fact that the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has long been populated by multiple ethnic groups, warps the true history of multi-ethnic development of the plateau into a false single-ethnic history, creates conflict and artificial differences among various ethnic groups of China, and seeks to establish a purely Tibetan "Greater Tibet" exclusive of all the other ethnic groups. It is thus an archetypal expression of racism and ultra-nationalism.
- "A high degree of autonomy" attempts to set up "a state within a state," which contravenes the Constitution and state systems.
"A high degree of autonomy," also described as "true autonomy" or "genuine autonomy," is another core element of the "middle way" advocated by the Dalai Lama and his followers. It purports to pursue the "power of autonomy" in language, culture, religious affairs, education, environmental protection and some other fields, subject to the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. But, the Dalai party's demands for "a high degree of autonomy" also include claims that undermine national unity, sovereignty and the state systems of China; the essence of "a high degree of autonomy" is to set up "a state within state" free of any control from the central government. The first issue is the relationship between the "autonomous government" and the central government of China. Through "a high degree of autonomy," the Dalai group proposes to establish an "autonomous government" through "democratic elections." "All affairs except diplomacy and national defense should be under the full responsibility of the Tibetan people"; and "Tibetan people should have the power to set up a local government, governmental organizations and institutions that meet their demands and are in line with their characteristics. The people's congresses in autonomous areas have the authority to make laws and regulations for all issues, and the enforcement power and discretionary power in all departments of the autonomous government..."
This actually places the "autonomous government" in a position of independence and removes it from any level of authority exercised by the central government; it establishes an alternative set of political systems by overturning the ones currently effective in Tibet Autonomous Region.
The second issue concerns military affairs in Tibet. The Dalai party takes the position that "Only when troops of the Communist Party of China withdraw completely from the region, can we start real reconciliation." It also demands that "regional peace conferences shall be held to ensure Tibet remains a demilitarized zone," proposing to turn Tibet into an "international zone of peace" and a "buffer between China and India," attempting to move China's internal affairs into the international arena.
Tibet is a component of the People's Republic of China, and the central government stationing troops in Tibet serves as a symbol of state sovereignty and is out of the needs of national security. The Dalai group's opposition to the central government stationing troops in Tibet is clear evidence of its intention to seek complete independence.
The third issue concerns the rights of other ethnic groups. The Dalai group demands that the central government must "prevent further migration into Tibet and return the Han people who have migrated into Tibet back to China." Samdhong Rinpoche, an influential figure in the Dalai group, declared in a speech in 2005, "The whole area inhabited by Tibetan people should be under the regional ethnic autonomous control of Tibetans themselves; Han and other groups are like guests and should not restrict our rights in any form."
As has already been demonstrated, the so-called "Greater Tibet" region, and particularly the neighboring areas of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, has for centuries been a corridor of frequent migration of China's different ethnic groups, who have lived together and depended on each other in this region. The Dalai group's logic is absurd and chilling, proposing to force tens of millions of people of other ethnic groups out of this region where they have lived for generations. The net result of "a high degree of autonomy" would be tantamount to an ethnic cleansing of the plateau.
The fourth issue concerns the "one country, two systems" policy. The Dalai group bases its demand for "a high degree of autonomy" on the "one country, two systems" policy; it believes that Tibet is "special" and should have even greater rights of autonomy than Hong Kong and Macau.
"One country, two systems" is a basic state policy adopted by the central government of China to resolve the issues of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, and to realize the peaceful reunification of our country. But the Tibet issue has nothing in common with the situation in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. The Taiwan issue was a carry-over from the KMT-CPC civil war. The issues of Hong Kong and Macau were the direct result of imperialist aggression against China, and they concerned the resumption of sovereignty. Tibet has been an integral part of China's territory since ancient times, over which the central government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction. So the issue of resuming exercise of sovereignty does not arise.
This demonstrates that "a high degree of autonomy" is a mask that conceals the true aim of realizing complete independence; and its purpose is to deny China's sovereignty over Tibet and establish a "Greater Tibet" beyond the jurisdiction of the central government. There is no prospect of it ever coming to pass, for the following reasons:
First, it violates the principles of the Constitution of China concerning ethnic relationships. The Constitution states clearly in the Preamble: "The People's Republic of China is a unitary multi-ethnic state built up jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have been established among them and will continue to be strengthened. In the struggle to safeguard the unity of the ethnic groups, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and also necessary to combat local-national chauvinism." Article 4 says: "All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal... Discrimination against and oppression of any ethnic group are prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the ethnic groups or instigate their secession are prohibited." The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy stipulates in Article 48: "The organ of self-government of an ethnic autonomous area shall guarantee equal rights for the various ethnic groups in the area." The Dalai group's demands for "a high degree of autonomy" are an expression of ultra-nationalism that negates the equal rights of ethnic groups in Tibet.
