Last December, I had the opportunity to discuss this with Professor Allison when we were attending a forum in Singapore. I suggested that should China and the U.S. become enemies, the future of the whole world would be altered. He fully agreed, but nevertheless, expressed concern over the possibility of war between China and the U.S. triggered by Taiwan or the South China Sea issue, which, if either becomes true, would be a textbook case of how a rising power and a ruling power fall into the "Thucydides trap." During this forum, Professor Allison said in his speech that for the U.S., the preeminent geostrategic challenge of this era is not violent Islamic extremists or a resurgent Russia, it is the impact of China's ascendance, and it is an underestimation of the inherent risk in China-U.S. relations that has increased the possibility of war.
I offered different views in my comments. I said that the effect of economic globalization, the development of international institutions, interdependence among states and nuclear deterrents all points to the fact that today's world is totally different from those of WWI, WWII and the Cold War, and it is even a further cry from the isolated small world in ancient Greece, where Athens and Sparta fought over the Aegean. The "Thucydides trap" cannot be simply transplanted from then to now. What we should consider now is how, from the heights of our modern civilization, we can use our knowledge to more wisely address the complex factors that may trigger tension, competition and conflicts between major powers.
At present, when talking about the major power security dilemma, the attention is on China and the U.S.. It is widely acknowledged that how the two countries shape their bilateral relationship will define the general direction of the world in the 21st century.
President Xi Jinping, when speaking during his U.S. visit in Seattle on September 22, 2015, said: "There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves." In their meeting in Washington later, President Obama was reported to have responded to President Xi's remarks that he didn't believe in the "Thucydides trap" where conflicts were inevitable between existing and emerging powers, and that major countries, the U.S. and China in particular, should avoid conflicts. He also said he was confident that the U.S. and China have the ability to manage their differences.
China is a growing power with a population four times that of the U.S. The U.S. is a super power that claims to "continue to lead the world for a century to come," and its difficulties with China appear to be complicated and multifaceted. For example, during the American presidential election, every candidate has tried to blame China for the U.S.' economic problems and play up conflicts of interest between the two countries. But in the real world, difficulties in this area are not impossible to manage given the two countries' deeply integrated interests. The political differences are harder to resolve because of the U.S.' critical attitude about China's political system. But as China has become too strong to be undermined by outside powers, the two sides should be smart enough not to challenge each other on this front. The current main concern lies with the rising trust deficit in the field of strategic security, which may lead to misjudgment on both sides and increase the possibility of confrontation and conflict. The two sides need to face the issues candidly and work to build mechanisms to prevent escalation.
A persistent concern troubling the U.S. is that China is attempting to replace it as leader of the world order. But the question is: do China and the U.S. have the same understanding about what the world/international order is? It's important that we tease out what exactly our differences are and how to disentangle them.
What the U.S. strives to preserve is a "U.S.-led world order," which rests upon American values, its global military alliance structure and the network of international institutions centered on the United Nations.
China is excluded from this order in at least two aspects: First, China is ostracized for having a different political system; second, America's collective defense arrangements do not cover China's security interests. It also stands in contrast to China's common and cooperative security concept. What China identifies with is the international order underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. China was among the first countries to put its signature on the UN Charter, and has been one of its beneficiaries and contributors. Nonetheless, China and the U.S. do not necessarily have completely opposing views on "order". They largely agree with each other on the world's general need for peace and development, as well as the importance of multilateral institutions with the UN at its core. Should China and the U.S. wish to avoid sliding into the so-called Thucydides trap of a head-on clash between a rising and an established power, they'll need to create a new concept of "order" that is more inclusive and can accommodate the interests and concerns of all countries, providing a common roof for all.
